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Abstract 
Using a recent representative survey and supplemental interviews, we investigate 
household money management and domestic power dynamics in contemporary Russian two-
partner families. During the Soviet period, it was women that typically managed household 
money. Today, while 45.6% of contemporary Russian two-partner households pool money 
and manage it jointly, and in about a quarter of families women are in charge, families with 
men in control of domestic money are on the rise among more affluent spouses who have 
been married for less than 20 years. While previous work finds evidence for the feminization 
of poverty in the postcommunist region, we underscore the otherwise hidden aspects of 
inequality – gendered access to household money among the relative “winners” of the 
transition: younger and more affluent families. We place these changes in the context of 
neoliberal market reforms, including labor market and welfare policy changes and the rise of 
neo-conservative gender ideology. 
Key Words: Money, household, gender, power  
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The main objective of the paper is to analyze how money is managed in contemporary 
Russian two-partner families in the context of Russia’s postcommunist transition.1 Do both 
spouses manage money jointly or does one spouse have a greater say in how the family spends 
its money? The question of who is in charge of family budgets has far-reaching implications 
for how, to what ends resources are allocated. For instance, when women manage money, more 
money is going towards common uses, and in particular, towards children’s needs, including 
clothing, education and activities, while when men do it, they tend to spend more on their 
personal leisure (Ferree 1990; Zelizer 1997; Nyman 2003; Lundberg, Pollak and Wales 1997). 
More specifically, this is a story about the change in managing family money bought 
about by the economic, political and cultural changes accompanying the collapse of the 
Soviet regime, and the growth of markets and market ideology. Our data come from a 2011 
representative survey of Russians and supplemental interviews with a convenience sample of 
156 heterosexual couples. The baseline for the argument about change is available qualitative 
evidence that money in Soviet households were typically managed by women (Ashwin and 
Lytkina 2004; Kiblitskaya 2000; Kukhterin 2000) (comparable quantitative studies of 
domestic money management from the Soviet period simply do not exist). An additional data 
source is a quantitative study conducted in 1998 (Clarke 2002), the early transitional period, 
characterized by deep recession, high inflation and variable, unstable, often unpredictable 
household incomes. Clarke finds that 80% of couples pooled money partially or fully. We 
interpret this evidence to indicate a shift from women-controlled household budgets of the 
more stable Soviet period. Our data then are focused on the late transitional period of relative 
prosperity, a result of more than 10 years of steady economic growth, relatively low inflation 
and lower poverty rate than for the previous decade. We find that while 45.6% of all Russian 
couples pool their money fully or partially (significantly less that what Clarke reports), there 
is also a considerable number of couples, particularly younger and more affluent, whose 
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money management can be characterized as male-dominated. This, we argue, is a new trend, 
and a sign of changes in values and growing prosperity. 
Our analysis contributes to the ongoing debate on the effects of postcommunist 
transitions on gender inequality. The evidence on whether postcommunist reforms increased 
or reduced gender inequality in the region is mixed (Heyns 2005), although studies focused 
specifically on Russia argue that gender inequality indeed increased (Ogloblin 1999; LaFont 
2001; Gerber and Mayorova 2006; Kozina and Zhidkova 2006). Some work finds evidence 
for the feminization of poverty in East and Central Europe (Fodor 2002), while others 
emphasize that poverty and gender inequality are correlated with family structure and they 
increase with the prevalence of female-dominated households (Popova 2002), underscoring 
particular vulnerability of Russian households, which are more likely to be headed by a 
female than in the rest of the postcommunist region. Our analysis is limited to two-partner 
households and it draws attention to the otherwise hidden aspect of inequality – the unequal 
intrahousehold control over monetary resources. We argue that it is particularly among the 
relative “winners” of the transition -- more affluent families and younger, postcommunist 
marriages, that intrahousehold gender inequality is the highest. It is the first attempt to 
account for different budget management strategies in Russian two-partner families based on 
representative all-Russian survey data.  
Although some researchers recently started questioning the very usefulness of discrete 
categories in characterizing family financial management (Burgoyne and Morison 1997; 
Ashby and Burgoyne 2008; Burgoyne 2008; Bennett 2013), in part because the categories 
may hide the complexities of actual financial relations between family members, and others 
advocate for constructing survey instruments based on previously collected and analyzed 
qualitative data (Cantillon 2013), we pursue a decidedly different approach. The dearth of 
any systematic data on money management in Russian households motivated our decision to 
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start out by analyzing quantitative survey data first, in order to track major tendencies on a 
broad scale, and compare them with existing surveys of money management in Western 
societies (Pahl 1989; Vogler 1994).  
Our paper also contributes to the literature on household gender power dynamics. 
First, our findings counter Pahl’s (2005) argument about the increasing individualization in 
the domestic finances of British couples. According to our data, independent management of 
finances is very rare among Russian households (only 4% of respondents report this type of 
FBMS in their households). And pooling money together – a strategy documented by Clarke 
in the midst of ongoing economic recession in the second half of the 1990s, is no longer as 
widespread. We suggest that relative economic stability increased discretionary incomes for 
some families, and changed the gender power dynamic by having men assume greater power 
over domestic finances.   
 
Background 
We draw on the two discrete bodies of literature: the studies of Soviet and post-Soviet 
families, and the literature on household management of money, which mostly focuses on 
Western (mainly British, but also American, Australian, Swedish, New Zealander and 
Portugese) families (Edwards 1982; Burgoyne 1990; Vogler and Pahl 1993; Vogler and Pahl 
1994; Pahl 1995; Burgoyne and Morison 1997; Fleming 1997; Vogler 1998; Nyman 1999; 
Kenney 2006; Vogler, Brockmann and Wiggins 2006; Coelho 2014). Management of budgets 
in postcommunist households received no systematic attention so far. 
In the vast majority of urban Soviet families, husbands were expected to give most if 
not all of their cash wages to their wives who would spend them on household needs. This was 
a direct outcome of the Soviet gender regime, which aimed at undermining the traditional 
household with its reliance on the male breadwinner. The Soviet gender regime kept wages 
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universally low, tied masculinity to men’s service to the socialist party-state, made women 
dependent for support on the state rather than their husbands and promoted the Soviet women’s 
mother-worker identity – a working woman that was expected to take over all the key roles in 
the family (Kiblitskaya 2000; Kukhterin 2000). Soviet women’s involvement in the household 
was paralleled with men’s relative marginalization from the family given that the state 
undermined men’s claim to sole breadwinning, and was rather vague on fatherhood, which 
never received as much state support, ideological and otherwise, as motherhood. Most 
household income went to pay for necessities, the chore that befell women by the extension of 
their central role in the household.  
Moreover, in socialist “economies of shortages” (Kornai 1980) the time-consuming 
task of procuring for the household needs (involving constant negotiation of access to scarce 
goods, mobilization of one’s social networks, frequent scouting of stores in the hope to be “in 
the right place at the right time” or, simply, queuing), was left to women, thus most of the 
spending decisions were also theirs to make. While some authors view this as “double-burden” 
(LaFont 2001), others underscore women’s power over appropriation of resources and 
allocation of household money (Vinokurova 2007; see also Iversen [2003] who similarly 
argued, based on data from developing countries, that their role in the management of 
household resources may be a source of within-family power for women).  
The collapse of the Soviet regime ushered in a decade-long recession, which for the 
majority of Russian families meant that incomes, albeit universally low, were no longer 
guaranteed, but unpredictable, uncertain and unstable (on wage arrears, see Guseva 2008). The 
very structure of Russian households changed too, as the near-universal employment of both 
genders and the ubiquity of two-earner families in Russia were replaced with a greater variety 
of family models including the emergence of breadwinner-housewife families, particularly if 
there are small children, since the state no longer provides universal subsidized nursery and 
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childcare. Clarke’s (2002) finding that 80% of households pooled money in 1998 illustrates 
people’s response to the uncertainty of the postcommunist economic crisis in Russia 
(Shevchenko 2009). We provide a more recent analysis of money management in Russian 
households during the period of relative economic stability, low inflation and increasing 
discretionary incomes. 
 The two key perspectives on household budget management are the economic resource 
perspective and gender roles/gender ideology literature. The economic resource perspective 
predicts that the spouse who earns more will have more say, including financial decision-
making. Greater monetary contributions should also legitimize doing less housework (Blood 
and Wolf 1960). Following this logic, employed wives should exert more power than non-
working ones (including access to resource distribution and ability to reduce the housework 
burden), and those wives that work full-time should have more power than those with part-time 
employment. This approach has been criticized as “gender-neutral” (Bittman et al. 2003; Brines 
1994), and has been challenged by three specific kinds of evidence.  
First, historically, the dollar earned by a woman did not prove to be equal to the dollar 
earned by a man making any direct comparisons of “who contributes more” complicated. When 
women’s earnings are called «pin money» (Zelizer 1997), they are devalued, suggesting that 
the increased female income does not proportionally increase women’s power within marriage 
(Ferree 2010). 
Second, in contemporary lower-income families, even if the man is the main 
breadwinner, it is the woman that usually holds the family’s purse because most money goes 
towards household-related necessities, underscoring the idea that in poor families managing 
money is a more of a burden, a chore of “making ends meet” rather than a privilege bestowed 
upon a higher earner (Vogler and Pahl 1993; Zelizer 1997; Fodor 2006; Kenney 2006; but see 
Iversen [2003] for an alternative perspective).  
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Third, in families where women outearn men, or where women work and men do not, 
women frequently resort to “doing gender” by vesting their “financial fate into the man, giving 
him complete control over their money» (Zelizer 1997: 109; see also West and Zimmermann 
1987). Women’s greater earnings may also not buy them out of doing housework, on the 
contrary, gender deviance may result in women doing more housework (or, specifically, more 
“gender-appropriate” housework, see Schneider 2012), to compensate for what may be 
perceived as a threat to hegemonic Western conceptions of femininity and masculinity (Ferree 
1990, Hochschild 2003; Ferree 2010; see Ashwin and Lytkina [2004] for similar findings in 
postcommunist Russia).   
Literature on gender roles and ideologies provides an alternative view: marriage gives 
spouses an opportunity to claim and fulfill their pursuits of gender identities (Brines 1994), so 
rather than spousal economic contributions, it is cultural ideas about gender-appropriate 
domestic responsibilities, including the management of financial resources of the household, 
that determine how money is managed in the family (Zelizer 1997; Rake and Jayatilaka. 2002; 
Hochschild 2003; Ferree 2010). By entering into marriage people do not only channel their 
resources into it, but also enter into socially-sanctioned agreements about their (gendered) roles 
as partners. 
Zelizer (1997) traced the historical evolution of different types of budget management 
in American households from the late 19th into early 20th century. While women were in charge 
of domestic money in the lower classes, in the upper classes, wives went from receiving 
irregular doles to regular household allowances, which, in turn, sometimes gave way to “shared 
purse”, an example of true partnership in the household. The most recent trend in family budget 
management is individualization of finance (see also Pahl 2005) via separate accounts.  
We bring the focus on resource allocation and domestic power to the analysis of budget 
management in contemporary Russian households. 
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Data and Methods 
The data come from the third wave of “Household Financial Behaviour Monitor” 
(conducted by National Research University -- Higher School of Economics in October-
November 2011). The survey is based on a representative sample of Russia’s adult population 
(aggregate sample size is 1600 people, sample error is 3.4%). The survey was administered to 
individuals who were asked about their family money management, rather than to designated 
breadwinners or to both spouses separately. After selecting those who are partnered, and 
excluding missing data, the analysis is conducted on 710 respondents. Compared to the original 
sample, people between the ages of 25 to 65, families with children under the age of 18, and 
those that are employed are slightly overrepresented. We use “family” and “household” 
interchangeably despite there being separate traditions of relating the former to kinship, 
marriage or dependence and the latter to living together and shared home upkeep 
responsibilities. We used SPSS and R Studio for analysis and graphic visualization of the results 
of multinomial regressions. 
Our analysis is based on the answers to the question “Who in your family disposes 
(rasporyazhaetsya) of income?” Seven categories are offered: 1) male whole wage (husband 
individually manages all the funds, but gives personal spending money to his wife or children); 
2) female whole wage (same as above except most money is under wife’s control); 3) male-
controlled housekeeping allowance (husband gives his wife a fixed amount for household 
needs while keeping the rest under his control); 4) female-controlled housekeeping allowance 
(same as above except it is the husband that receives a household allowance from his wife); 5) 
joint pool (spouses pool all the funds together); 6) partial pool (spouses pool a portion of the 
funds together to pay for common expenses while retaining personal spending money); 7) 
independent management (spouses manage their funds separately). Our questionnaire does not 
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explicitly distinguish between decision-making power (control) and date-to-day management 
of money. While there is a call to distinguish more explicitly between these two concepts, as 
the latter more indicative of intrahousehold power (Safilios-Rothschild 1970, Pahl 1989), we 
believe that there are usually elements of both in money management (see Iversen 2003 for an 
argument of women’s empowerment connected with managing scarce money), which is often 
both a time-consuming chore and a high-stakes task.  The word “rasporyazhat’sya” (to dispose 
of), which is typically paired with “money,” captures this tension well as it literally means both 
“to manage” and “to order, to control.”  
Our survey data analysis is complemented with illustrations from the semi-structured 
face-to–face interviews with a convenience sample of 156 Russian couples, married or 
cohabiting, interviewed separately (interviews conducted in 2011).  
 
Descriptive Results 
The most prevalent budget managements system among Russian two-partner 
households is joint or partial pool (45.6% in aggregate, Figure 1), followed by female whole 
wage (22.3%) and male-controlled housekeeping allowance (17%). Together, female-
dominated budget management systems (female whole wage and female-controlled 
housekeeping allowance combined) account for 24.9% families in the sample, and male-
dominated systems (male whole wage and male-controlled housekeeping allowance combined) 
– for 23% of families. Four percent (4%) reported independent budget management. The 
prevalence of joint/partial pool is similar to British households (Pahl [1989] and Vogler 
[1994]), but starkly different from Clark’s 1998 Russian study where as much as 80% of the 
families reported managing money jointly.  
Figure 1 HERE 
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Since the survey asked individuals, and not both spouses, we explored the differences 
between male and female respondents’ answers. 1.4 times more women than men identified 
their family budget management system as female whole wage management (26.1% against 
18.6%). 3.2 times more men than women indicate that their families adhere to male whole 
wage management system (9.2% against 2.9%). Chi-square test confirms the differences are 
significant (results not shown). 
Next, we explored the question of whether the choice of a budget management system 
is correlated with spouses’ employment statuses. In line with resource dependency theory, we 
expected two-earner families more likely than one-earner families to report that the money is 
pooled, while one-earner families more likely than other types of families to report that the 
family earner is also in charge of the family money. We divided all families into four groups 
by employment status of the respondent and their partner at that time (both work, neither works, 
husband works/wife does not, wife works/husband does not). Seven original family budget 
management categories were collapsed into four: male-dominated, female-dominated, pooling 
and independent management.    
In all types of spousal employment arrangements, pooling is the most common system 
of budget management (from 38% of breadwinner-housewife families on the low end to 47% 
each of two-earner families and families where women are employed and men are not; chi-
square test confirms the differences are significant, results not shown). But in 30% of 
breadwinner-housewife families, men are solely in charge of managing family money, while 
this is true for only 24% of husbands in dual-earner families. Women are most commonly in 
charge of managing family money when they are employed and their husbands are not (38% 
of such families adhere to female-dominated systems), or when neither of the spouses is 
employed (36% of families).  
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Next, we correlate length of marriage and the reported budget management system. 
Independent management and pooling rates are similar irrespective of how long the spouses 
have been married. But the rate of female-dominated budget management system is greater 
among those who have been married longer reaching 34% for marriages of more than 30 
years (chi-square test confirms the differences are significant, results not shown). Conversely, 
the rate of male-dominated systems is the highest among those who are married for 6 to 20 
years, as opposed to shorter or longer marriages, falling sharply for those who are married 21 
years and longer. The 20-year mark neatly coincides with the collapse of the Soviet regime 
and the start of the postcommunist reforms. Female-dominated systems of budget 
management are more common in older marriages that were conceived during the Soviet-era 
(they are the second most common type of money management after shared pool among these 
couples). Conversely, male-dominated systems are more common in younger, “post-
communist marriages” (they are the second most-common type of budget management after 
shared pool among these couples). 
 
Hypotheses and Measurements 
In order to test simultaneous effects of different factors on the choice of a family budget 
management system, we ran multinomial logistic regression. The dependent variable is the type 
of budget management used in the family, and it contains four categories: (1) male-dominated, 
(2) female-dominated, (3) pooling, and (4) independent management. Joint/partial pool is set 
as a baseline category.  
Based on the results of our descriptive analysis and our theoretical discussion, we 
formulated the following hypotheses. First, since the indication of one’s family money 
management system is a perception, we expect the gender of the respondent to have an 
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independent effect, each gender likely “overstating” the degree of their involvement in money 
management. H1: Women are more likely than men to report that their family adheres to a 
female-dominated system of managing family money, and men – to indicate that their family 
employs a male-dominated management system. 
Second, based on earlier findings that women tend to manage family money in lower 
income families, we expect the choice of a family money management system to be influenced 
by the family income. H2: The lower the income, the more likely women are to be in charge of 
family money; the higher the family income, the more likely the money management system to 
be male-dominated. 
Next, we put forth three hypotheses to test the effect of spousal employment: H3a: The 
employed spouse in a one-earner household is more likely than in other types of families to be 
in charge of family money because of resource perspective; H3b: The employed spouse in a 
one-earner household is less likely than in other types of families to manage money because of 
the opportunity cost logic and time commitments involved. 
Based on British data (Vogler and Pahl [1993]) that demonstrated that more educated 
couples held more egalitarian views and were more likely to pool money together, we put forth 
H4: The higher the level of education attained by spouses the more likely their household is to 
adhere to a joint pool budget management system. 
In addition, we hypothesize that the older spouses and/or those who have been married 
longer, are more likely to be influenced by the Soviet era gender regime, which placed women 
at the helm of household, including managing family money.  Men are more likely to be in 
charge of money in in younger couples/marriages, all things being equal. 
H5. The older the couple is, the more likely the wives are to be in charge of managing 
family money; the younger the couple is, the more likely the husbands are. 
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H6.  The longer the couple has been married, the more likely the wives are to be in 
charge of managing family money; the more recent the marriage is, the more likely the 
husbands are. 
Finally, we also hypothesize the effect of parental socialization.  Given the marginal 
position of men in Soviet households, we put forth H7: In those couples that adhere to the 
same budget management system as practiced by their parents, wives are more likely to 
manage money than in couples that do not. In those couples that do not adhere to the same 
budget management system as their parents, the choice of a system is more likely to be male-
dominated than in couples that do. Again, here we measure respondent’s perception, and we 
expect it to differ by gender, therefore we include an interaction term. 
The predictor variables are the following: 
- respondent’s gender 
- per capita family income (log) 
- spousal employment: (1) husband and wife both work, (2) husband works, wife does 
not, (3) wife works, husband does not, (4) neither husband nor wife works);  
- husband’s education: (1) lower secondary, secondary, vocational, (2) special 
secondary, (3) incomplete higher education, higher education; 
- wife’s education (same categories as above); 
- average age of spouses; 
- length marriage or cohabiting; 
- whether respondent’s parents managed family money in the same way (self-reported 
by the respondent, possible answers “yes” or “no”); 
- socio-demographic family type: 1) only couple; 2) couple with dependent children but 
no other adults; 3) couple with dependent children and other adults; 4) couple without 
dependent children but with other adults; 5) couple with grown-up children) 
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We introduce two additional variables (the number of children under the age of 18 in 
the household, and the number of adult household members other than the respondent, their 
partner and their children) to control for the demographic characteristics of the household. All 
nominal variables are converted into series of dichotomies (spousal employment, husband’s 
education, wife’s education and socio-demographic type of household), and are coded as 
dummy variables.  
 
Regression Results and Discussion 
Six coefficients are significant in the model (Table 1):  
- log of per capita family income (p=0.000) 
- the presence of the same type of budget management in the family of the parents of 
the respondent (p = 0.000) 
- respondent’s gender (p<0.05) 
- wife’s education (p <0.05)  
- years married (p <0.05) 
- the multiplier of respondent’s gender and the presence of the same type of financial 
management in a family of respondent’s parents (p <0.05)   
Table 1 HERE 
H3a and H3b (employment status) and H5 (average age) are rejected. Next, we 
visualize the probability of selecting a particular type of family budget management type based 
on the variables that were significant in the regression model (for a methodological discussion, 
see Fox and Hong 2009). 
Per capita family income.  
16 
 
The lower the family income, the higher the likelihood of a female-dominated budget 
management system. The likelihood of pooling money increases with the rise in income and 
plateaus for the most affluent group. The likelihood of male-dominated money management 
also increases with the rise in income and is the highest for the most affluent families (Table 1 
and Figure 2), in support of H2. (The estimate in Table 2 is not significant when the base 
category is joint pool, suggesting that the income may not be a meaningful predictor of 
choosing between joint pool and male-dominated management, but it is significant when the 
base category is female-dominated management. The latter results are not shown, available 
upon request). This is in agreement with the British and other Western data: women are more 
likely to be in charge of family incomes in low-income households than in middle- and higher-
income ones (Vogler 1998; see also Stocks, Diaz and Hallerod 2007; Bennett et al. 2010). We 
replicate these results using a large-scale representative survey data from a postcommunist 
transitional country, and draw particular attention to the emerging preference for male-
dominated management in more affluent post-Soviet families. 
Figure 2 HERE 
Gender 
Female respondents were more likely than male respondents to state that their families 
adhere to joint/partial pool and female-dominated budget management systems (Figure 3). 
Male respondents were much more likely to identify their family budget management system 
as male-dominated. H1 is supported. The probability of selecting an independent financial 
management system is also higher among men.  
Figure 3 HERE 
To make sense of these discrepancies we turn to qualitative interviews, conducted with 
both spouses separately, where we also find occasional mismatches between what husbands 
and wives say (there were 33 such couples in the sample of 156). Since the interviews were 
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carried out with a convenience sample of couples, we cannot say anything about the relative 
frequencies of such contradictions (other studies [Bennett et al. 2010; Cantillon 2013] 
highlighted such contradictions in responses between spouses). But several patterns are worth 
noting. First, when asked about budget management systems prevalent in their families, 
husbands and wives may mean different things. One of the spouses may state that in their 
family the money is pooled: once the money is earned, it is put into the common pot, and it 
loses its special identity as “his” or “her” money. But the other spouse may nevertheless state 
that once money is pooled, only one spouse, usually a woman, spends it. Since women are 
more likely to care for the household, the wife often makes most consumer purchases, and 
solely disposes of the family money in a sense of a wife-as-a-household-manager. Thus the 
contradiction could arise from a confusion between where the family money is located (pooled 
together, in the single bedside table drawer, or in the joint bank account, or, on the contrary, 
kept in separate purses), and who is in charge of spending it. Contradictions can also reflect the 
(frequently gendered) distinction that some couples made between day-to-day, smaller-scale 
spending and more global, larger-scale spending (Safilios-Rothschild 1970; Fleming 1997; 
Rake and Jayatilaka 2002; Sonnenberg 2008). Daily money management is often reserved for 
the wife (in the words of one of our female respondents, “I am responsible for ‘short-term 
projects’, and my husband – for ‘long-term ones’ [meaning savings and investments]”. This is 
by no means a clear distinction, however, as Pahl (1989) reveals that British women who are 
managers of domestic money often see themselves as being in control. 
Just like pooling money may not mean that money management is shared, keeping 
money separate may not mean that spouses manage their money independently. This is a point 
that was made by Fleming (1997) who argued that control over domestic money is not a direct 
consequence of a particular pattern of allocating money. To this we add another consideration. 
Independent management presupposes that incomes of the two spouses are perceived as 
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comparable. But as Zelizer (1997) reminds us, the wives’ income may be trivialized as “pin 
money” and largely discounted. Our qualitative interviews suggest that this is particularly 
likely when the woman makes significantly less than the man, resulting in a hybrid money 
management system that we call “his money is shared, but hers is hers alone,” as the wife is 
free to spend her income on her personal needs, while the husband plays the role of a provider. 
This arrangement may mean that the husband reports the family budget management system 
as male-dominated, while the wife calls it “independent management”. 
Finally, the contradiction in responses between spouses may also stem from the fact 
that the respondents may not know exactly how much their spouses earn. The husband may 
contribute a portion of his income towards the household expenses, and treat it as a household 
allowance with the balance under his control, but the wife, who may not be fully aware of her 
husband’s income, particularly, if a significant portion of it is “unofficial”, irregular and 
untaxed, may perceive it as part of the partial pool system, as she believes that most income 
is pooled and only some is kept for personal expenses. Inquiring about spending rather than 
earning estimates, Pahl (1989) found that when interviewed separately, British wives tend to 
underestimate how much their husbands spend on personal needs, while their husbands tend 
to overestimate how much the wives spend.  By most accounts, the size of the ‘gray’ 
economy in Russia comprises over a half of the GDP (Schneider 2008). A significant number 
of officially employed people receive a portion of their wage in cash to lower employers’ 
income and social security taxes. Entrepreneurs can similarly hide their income. Our 
interview data suggests that such income is not only hidden from the tax authorities but 
sometimes from one’s spouse.  
Socialization  
Those that said that they managed money the same way as their parents were more 
likely to adhere to a joint/partial pool or female-dominated budget management system, as 
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predicted in H7. Those that did not model their family budget management after their parents 
were more likely to describe their system of financial management as male-dominated (Figure 
4).  The effect differs by gender: female respondents who emulate their parents’ management 
of money are more likely to adhere to female-dominated and pooling systems in their families; 
male respondents -- to male-dominated systems (results not shown). Previous research 
investigated the effects of intergenerational socialization on the way that money is managed in 
the family. Based on a comparison of money management in two generations of British 
families, Lewis (2001) found that children are more likely to gravitate towards individual 
management of money compared to their parents. It could be that younger people tend to be 
more independent, or that the younger generation is subject to a different set of societal gender 
norms (more egalitarian). In another study, Nyman and Reinikainen (2007), more directly 
attribute the decisions of some Swedish women to manage money differently from the way 
their parents managed it, to the change in values as these women wanted to define themselves 
as “modern.” Our data should also be interpreted in the context of a profound (gender) value 
change. Conservative values and traditional gender views are taking over the values of the 
Soviet gender regime that placed women in control of households. Some families are rejecting 
female-dominated or shared money management systems favored by their parents in favor of 
male-dominated ones. 
Figure 4 HERE 
Education 
Families with more educated wives are less likely to adhere to a female-dominated 
budget management system, and more likely – to a joint pool, partially supporting H4 
(husband’s education has no effect) (Figure 5). British data also found a strong effect of 
education on the likelihood of a joint pool system, but contrary to our results, In Britain it was 
the husband’s education, and the not wife’s that mattered (Vogler and Pahl 1993). Russian 
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women are on average slightly more educated than Russian men, which can explain this 
difference. 
Figure 5 HERE 
Length of marriage 
Contrary to the descriptive results discussed above (Table 1), in the regression model, 
the probabilities of choosing female-dominated or independent management systems are 
almost constant irrespective of the length of the marriage. But marriage length, all things being 
equal, has a positive effect on adhering to a pooling system (Figure 6), and a negative effect on 
a male-dominated system, with husbands in younger marriaged more likely to be in charge of 
family finances. Two possible explanations for this seeming trade-off between pooling money 
together and having a male-dominated budget management system are the cohort effect (older, 
Soviet-era marriages tend to pool money together, whether or not money is managed together 
by husbands and wives or by women alone; while post-communist marriages are less 
egalitarian) or the life-cycle effect (overtime, marriages may become more egalitarian). 
Qualitative data suggests that both effects may take place. Couples that have been together for 
a long time often report that their money management arrangements have changed overtime 
depending on several factors, including the changes in the family’s overall income, spousal 
relative contributions to the family budget and/or their employment status, and the presence or 
absence of young children in the household. Longitudinal data are necessary to decisively rule 
in favor of either cohort or life-cycle effect. 
Figure 6 HERE 
Conclusion 
In a recent introduction to the special issue on household economies, Burgoyne (2008) 
advocated for “more and better research across national and cultural boundaries to explore, for 
example, cultures undergoing rapid social change, different economic and social contexts, and 
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material relationships that encompass more than a single household” (p. 456). This paper does 
precisely that: it analyzes money management in Russian two-spouse households in the context 
of ongoing fundamental economic and political transitions and accompanying changes in 
gender ideologies and values. This is the first attempt at analyzing budget management in the 
Russian families (or in any postcommunist society, to our knowledge) using representative 
survey data. The paper also contributes to the literature on gender inequality by highlighting 
its important, but frequently downplayed dimension -- intrafamily decisions about allocating 
monetary resources. Finally, it adds to a dialogue on the prevalence of different family budget 
management systems in Western and non-Western societies (the latter topic getting much less 
attention so far).  
The most common way to manage money in the Russian households is via a joint or 
partial pool, with smaller (and about equal) groups of respondents indicating female- or male-
dominated systems. The independent management is the least common system. Money 
management in Russian two-partner families varies according to several family-level factors, 
such as per-capita family income (the lower the level of the per capita family income, the more 
likely it is that the family budget is controlled by the wife), respondent’s gender (male 
respondents are twice as likely as female respondents to report that their family adheres to a 
male-dominated system of money management), length of marriage (the longer the couple 
lived together, the more likely they are to pool their incomes together and manage them jointly), 
wife’s education (families with more educated wives are more likely to manage money jointly) 
and the type of financial management used in the family of respondent’s parents (those 
respondents who did not emulate their parents’ way of management family money were more 
likely to adhere to a male-dominated system compare to those who followed their parents’ 
tracks; the latter were more likely to pool or have women manage money). What is particularly 
notable is the emergence of families with male-dominated budget management systems, 
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particularly among younger and more affluent spouses, who have been married for less than 
20 years (descriptive analysis suggests that a significantly higher percentage of men married 
for 6 to 20 years are in charge of family finances than those in shorter or longer marriages). 
We contribute to the literature on the effects of postcommunist reforms on gender inequality 
by drawing attention to gendered economic inequality at the level of households and arguing 
that wives are losing power in the household precisely as the overall wellbeing of the household 
increases.  
There are two limitations to the study results. First, our quantitative data consist of 
responses of individuals, not households. Although this is in line with the economic approach 
to studying decision-making by households (see, for instance, Becker (1991) who equates 
household decision-making with that of breadwinners), sociologists of gender and family 
challenge this assumption, and draw attention to conflict and negotiation over household 
responsibilities and chores. Indeed, we found significant gender differences in responses 
suggesting husbands and wives perceive family money management differently, and we 
explored these differences with our quantitative data, albeit using a non-random sample. Future 
research should collect data from both partners about money management in their household.  
Second, this is not a specialized study of family consumer finances, and the data do not 
contain detailed information about the earnings of every household member. Although we used 
husbands’ and wives’ employment statuses as proxies of their contributions, a stronger test of 
the economic dependency thesis would need to include data on both partners’ incomes. 
Economic growth, declining inequality and increasing family incomes in the 2000s Russia 
have been heralded as indicating the overall decline of economic vulnerabilities and improvement 
of family wellbeing. Our work suggests that increasing family incomes promotes gender 
inequalities in accessing family resources. Other work already illuminated the fact that men were 
historically more likely to control resources in upper class than lower class families (Zelizer 1997). 
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We lift the curtain on the dynamic process of the postcommunist transition in Russia to suggest 
that overall economic growth may nevertheless exacerbate inequalities within the family. Thus 
economic development indicators should not solely measure progress based on growing family 
incomes but also consider intrafamily dynamics and female empowerment.  
What policies would improve Russian women’s access to family resources? Women’s 
education is positively correlated with the likelihood of joint money management in the family; 
while male-dominated money management is connected, in a subset of families in our qualitative 
sample, to husbands’ and wives’ vastly unequal earnings, and to husbands’ informal and irregular 
incomes.  Therefore, policies directed at improving women’s educational and employment 
opportunities, and earning outcomes, and/or increasing overall economic transparency in the 
economy would help reduce these sources of intrafamily inequality, and, possibly, move us closer 
to creating fair economic arrangements in intimate relationships, or as Viviana Zelizer (2010) calls 
them “right mixes” of economic (resources and power) and intimate (relations).  
We would like to end with a call for more systematic and multi-method research on how 
families spend money, which would complement survey data with interviews and, ideally, direct 
observations of daily practices. After all, a picture is worth a thousand words. 
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Tables and Figures. 
Table 1. Likelihood Ratio Tests (only significant coefficients are presented). 
 Chi-Square Df Significance 
Intercept .000 0  
gender 8.878 3 0.031 
income 20.879 3 0.000 
wife’s education 12.918 6 0.044 
years married 8.492 3 0.037 
same budget 
management system as 
in the parents’ family 
(SBMS) 
21.959 3 0.000 
gender*SBMS 9.349 3 0.025 
Model Fit Measure: Pseudo R-Square (McFadden) .087 
Table 2. Parameter Estimates (Joint/partial pool is set as a baseline category)  
Female-dominated 
budget 
management 
B Wald df Sig 
Intercept 3.749 4.136 1 0.042 
gender 0.254 0.686 1 0.407 
income -0.573 11.205 1 0.001 
wife’s education* 
(incomplete 
secondary/secondary 
0.757 5.525 1 0.019 
wife’s education* 
(specialized 
secondary) 
0.307 1.319 1 0.251 
years married -0.023 2.274 1 0.132 
same budget 
management system 
as in the parents’ 
family (SBMS) 
0.023 0.008 1 0.931 
gender*SBMS 0.275 0.469 1 0.493 
*Incomplete higher/higher is a reference category 
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Male-dominated 
budget management 
B Wald df Sig 
Intercept -4.363 4.449 1 0.035 
gender -0.209 0.597 1 0.440 
income 0.281 2.169 1 0.141 
wife’s education* 
(incomplete 
secondary/secondary) 
0.549 2.776 1 0.096 
wife’s education* 
(specialized 
secondary education) 
0.026 0.010 1 0.919 
years married -0.047 8.205 1 0.004 
same budget 
management system 
as in the parents’ 
family (SBMS) 
1.381 17.392 1 0.000 
gender*SBMS 0.926 4.621 1 0.032 
*Incomplete higher/higher is a reference category 
Independent 
management 
B Wald df Sig 
Intercept 0.374 0.010 1 0.921 
gender -1.324 5.701 1 0.017 
income -0.028 0.007 1 0.935 
wife’s education* 
(incomplete 
secondary/secondary) 
0.375 0.519 1 0.471 
wife’s education* 
(specialized 
secondary education) 
-0.848 3.191 1 0.074 
years married -0.018 0.382 1 0.537 
same budget 
management system 
as in the parents’ 
family (SBMS) 
-0.221 0.130 1 0.718 
gender*SBMS -1.329 2.898 1 0.089 
*Incomplete higher/higher is a reference category 
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Figure 1. The distribution of household budget management systems in Russia, % 
 
 
Figure 2. Effect of per capita family income on budget management system 
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Figure 3. Effect of the respondent’s gender on budget management system 
 
 
Figure 4. Effect of budget management system in the respondent’s parents’ family on 
the budget management system in the respondent’s family 
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Figure 5. The effect of wife’s education on budget management system 
 
Figure 6. Effect of the length of marriage on the choice of budget management system 
 
1 This article reports the results of the research project implemented as part of the Basic Research Program at 
the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE). 
 
